On the heels of its recent decision in Mounted Police Association of Ontario,[1] and with more distant roots in its judgments in BC Health Services[2] and Fraser,[3] the Supreme Court of Canada has breathed new life into section 2(d) of the Charter as it relates to the Canadian workplace. The Court’s decision marks a historic moment, not only for workers, but for the continued vitality of the rights protected by the Charter.

In Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan (“SFL”), the unions challenged legislation granting public employers in the province the unilateral right to declare workers as performing “essential services”, meaning that they could not participate in an otherwise lawful strike. The Supreme Court found that this legislation violated workers’ freedom of association under 2(d) of the Charter: writing for the majority, Justice Rosalie Abella held that the right to strike is an essential part of meaningful collective bargaining and is protected by 2(d), and further held that the essential services regime in Saskatchewan could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter because, among other things, there was no independent check on employers’ unilateral right to prevent workers from striking.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly overruled its prior holding in the Alberta Reference,[4] nearly 30 years earlier, that freedom of association did not protect the right to strike. The analysis of the Court in SFL relies heavily on the dissenting reasons of Chief Justice Dickson in Alberta Reference, adopting his conclusion that “effective constitutional protection of the associational interests of employees in the collective bargaining process requires concomitant protection of their freedom to withdraw collectively their services, subject to s. 1 of the Charter.”

The Court’s wholesale endorsement of Chief Justice Dickson’s dissent shows that the Charter is indeed a “living tree”, and the Court is not afraid to permit it to grow and develop over time. In her majority reasons, Justice Abella writes that, in now including the right to strike, “s. 2(d) has arrived at the destination sought by Dickson C.J. in the Alberta Reference”. This language—likening section 2(d) to a kind of traveller—is a bold affirmation that Charter rights are not stagnant and will be interpreted to give effect to their underlying values, even as our understanding and acceptance of those values evolves over time.

In this way, the judgment in SFL can be seen as further validation of the approach in BC Health Services and Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford:[5] when the Court is faced with compelling arguments supported by a strong evidentiary record, it is prepared to revisit its past conclusions in order to give life to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

[1] Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1

[2] Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27

[3] Health Services, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20

[4] Alberta Reference (Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313)

[5] Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72

On January 7 and 8, 2015, Andrew Astritis appeared in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to argue a judicial review application. The application seeks to overturn a decision of an arbitrator on the right of employees to accumulate vacation credits.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan (“SFL”) will be remembered primarily for its historic conclusion that freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes a protection for workers’ right to strike.

But the comprehensive reasons of the majority also offer strong confirmation of the persuasive role that international law and Canada’s international commitments play when interpreting Charter rights.

International Law and the Charter

In determining that the freedom of association protects the right to strike, the Supreme Court gave significant, substantive consideration to the development of the right to strike within international law.

The Court concluded that there is an emerging international consensus that meaningful collective bargaining requires a right to strike and that this consensus, when combined with similar historical and legal developments, required recognition of the right to strike within the Charter.

That international law plays some role in interpreting Charter rights comes as no surprise. The Supreme Court has long recognized that Charter rights should be interpreted consistently with Canada’s international human rights obligations. As the often-cited passage by former Chief Justice Dickson recognized:

…the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.

Without more specific guidance from the Supreme Court, however, the use of international instruments as interpretive tools has often been stalled by practical questions as to how they may be used and by significant resistance from the provincial and federal governments to their use in the first place.

In fact, before the courts in SFL, many of the government interveners argued that little weight should be given to the status of the right to strike internationally. They argued that the Charter does not incorporate Canada’s international commitments and that there is no obligation to constitutionally protect rights recognized in international law. They also suggested that courts should not rely on international instruments to which Canada is not a party.

Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decision

In its reasons, the Court soundly rejected all arguments to limit the persuasiveness or relevance of international law. Instead, the Court confirmed that international law plays a crucial role in interpreting rights under the Charter.

The Court’s reasons also offer a number of broader lessons about the use of international law going forward.

• First, international law, particularly in areas of growing international consensus, can and should play a central role in informing the evolving content of rights under the Charter. Developments in international law over time are, consequently, relevant when assessing whether to recognize rights in Canada. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had previously rejected this position.
• Second, courts should give consideration to a wide range of international instruments, even those which do not formally bind Canada. The Supreme Court looked beyond the well-established sources of Canadian legal obligations, such as international treaties which Canada has ratified, and relied on other authorities whose potential interpretive power had previously been unclear, including decisions of the International Labour Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Association, decisions made under the European Convention on Human Rights, and labour legislation and decisions from other countries.
• Finally, the Court recognized that the expertise of certain specialized international bodies will provide their decisions with “considerable persuasive weight.” The Court made this statement particularly with regards to the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association, suggesting that its decisions will continue to guide future labour cases under section 2(d).

Conclusion

While some questions may remain in terms of how to practically apply international instruments as interpretive aids, the above principles – and the Supreme Court’s unequivocal support for their application – provide clear and decisive confirmation that international law considerations will form an essential part of Charter claims going forward.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

Our firm is renewing its partnership with the University of Ottawa and continues its commitment and funding to the Raven, Cameron, Ballantyne & Yazbeck LLP/s.r.l. Human Rights/Social Justice Internship. This exciting opportunity provides an excellent and meaningful summer work experience to students who are particularly interested in issues pertaining to social justice, human rights or equality rights. This is the 10th consecutive year that this paid internship has been sponsored by RavenLaw.

This is a program that we are very proud of as it gives students excellent experience in these areas but also provides legal support to social justice organizations. This year, the host organizations include the Workers History Museum.

Students seeking information about the internship should contact Chelsea Paradis. If your organization works in the areas of social justice and human rights and you are interested in having an intern in the future, please contact David Yazbeck at 613-567-2901.

Nowadays most employees spend at least a portion of their workday using a computer, raising important privacy questions of what kinds of computer surveillance employers can implement on their employees’ work computers and under what circumstances.

Questions relating to employer surveillance – when? why? how much is too much? – are long-standing issues in both unionized and non-unionized workplaces. Traditionally, decision-makers have been sharply divided over when employers can implement surreptitious video surveillance over their employees, for example, and then rely on videotape evidence for later discipline.

This division has largely centred on a fundamental disagreement between decision-makers as to whether employees have a right to privacy in the workplace. This same disagreement carried over into the early computer surveillance decisions, where courts and arbitrators routinely found that employees had no expectation of privacy in work computers and upheld discipline and even termination based on non-work computer use.

Protecting the “Biographical Core”: R v Cole

That perception was shaken by a number of cases in the early 2000’s, but none moreso than the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 2011 and the Supreme Court’s 2012 decisions in R v Cole. While Cole dealt with a challenge to the search and seizure of an employee’s work computer by police, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to comment more broadly on employees’ right to privacy in their work computers. The Court found that an expectation of privacy could be inferred where personal computer use was permitted or reasonably expected:

Computers that are reasonably used for personal purposes – whether found in the workplace or the home – contain information that is meaningful, intimate, and touching on the user’s biographical core. Vis-à-vis the state, everyone in Canada is constitutionally entitled to expect privacy in personal information of this kind.

While workplace policies and practices may diminish an individual’s expectation of privacy in a work computer, these sorts of operational realities do not in themselves remove the expectation entirely: The nature of the information at stake exposes the likes, interest, thoughts, activities, and searches for information of the individual user.

Implications for Employees: Right to Privacy at Work

While the long-term implications of Cole are not yet clear – particularly given that the Court declined to comment specifically on employer computer surveillance or the ability of an employer to seize and search a work computer – decision-makers have begun to adopt its reasoning to find a breach of employee privacy rights when employers engage in surreptitious, unjustified computer surveillance. For example:

• The British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner found an employer internet usage audit to be a breach of privacy where the employee had never attempted to hide his internet usage and had never been approached about it by the employer prior to the audit.
• The Alberta Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner found that an employer had contravened privacy legislation when it installed keystroke logging software on an employee’s computer to monitor productivity. The Commissioner particularly noted the availability of less intrusive measures and the failure to limit the scope of the employer’s investigation.

These examples aside, however, decision-makers have yet to fully address the question of what Cole will mean for the traditional approaches to employer surveillance. While older cases extended employers a nearly unfettered right to set ethical, professional and operational standards for their workplace, Cole recognized that employer policies and practices may diminish a privacy right but cannot remove it entirely. Whether future decision-makers will accept a robust conception of employee privacy rights or will return to tests largely based on employer reasonableness remains to be seen.

A Right Without A Remedy

In any event, the suggestion in some post-Cole case law that employers ought to undertake less intrusive steps prior to surveilling employee computers raises a separate, perplexing question: what happens if employers don’t?

So far, Privacy Commissioners, in large part because of the nature of their authority, have provided for little in the way of remedy beyond ordering that the surveillance cease. For employees whose privacy was breached or who have been disciplined as a result of this intrusion, this may provide little comfort.

More recently, the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench upheld the decision of a labour arbitrator which relied in part on an employee’s privacy interest in her work computer to reduce a termination for inappropriate email use to a suspension.

Other decision-makers, however, have found that an employer’s violation of privacy rights cannot lessen the seriousness of inappropriate work computer use. In these circumstances, it has been suggested that decision-makers can do no more than recommend that the employer take privacy interests into account in the future.

The decisions in Cole took significant steps towards changing how we discuss employee privacy in relation to work computers. As the trial judge in Cole stated, office computers are much like office desks and personal papers much like personal computer files. However, until decision-makers develop a substantive way to provide remedies for the breach of an employee’s privacy interest in his or her work computer, the change in how we talk about privacy rights at work cannot translate into protection for employees.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

On January 13, 2015, Daniel Tucker-Simmons, an articling student at RavenLaw, won a case before the Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now). ACORN has been fighting for years to improve housing conditions in the low – mid income areas in Ottawa for its members and others.

The case involved a landlord’s failure to repair a 150-meter stretch of walkway which had fallen into disrepair, creating a serious safety hazard for residents. Despite years of repair requests by residents, including ACORNmember Mavis Finnamore, prior landlords and the current landlords did not repair the walkway.

After Ms. Finnamore filed an application with the Board, RavenLaw provided Daniel’s services to represent ACORN member Mavis Finnamore at the Board hearing. Daniel’s victory before the Board means that the landlord will have to pay to fix the walkway. The victory is also the latest in a series of big wins for ACORN’s housing justice campaign, which stretches back to 2011 and has helped residents achieve over $200,000 in rent abatements and repair work.

Read more about the case on ACORN’s blog.

On November 13, 2014, in PSAC v Attorney General of Canada, 2014 FC 1066, the Federal Court considered Part XX of the Canada Occupational Health and Safety Regulations, which imposes a host of obligations on employers to prevent and respond to workplace violence. The Court’s decision affirmed the broad definition of workplace violence under the Regulations, and the mandatory obligations on employers to appoint an impartial person to investigate employee complaints.

The Court clearly held that the definition of workplace violence is broad enough to include harassing conduct that causes mental or psychological harm, stating that “to find otherwise would unduly restrict the definition of work place violence and not give a purposive construction to that definition.” The Court also held that the employer may not act unilaterally as an investigator of workplace violence and that, unless it is plain and obvious on the face of the complaint that it does not relate to workplace violence, the employer is under a mandatory duty to appoint an impartial person to investigate the complaint.

This judgment is an important gain for workers, because it grants access to the mechanisms under Part XX to seek redress for harassment in the workplace. The process under Part XX—particularly, the mandatory appointment of an impartial investigator—is now available for federally regulated workers that experience harassment.

The case was argued by Andrew Raven of our firm. You can read more about this case in on our blog.

In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Attorney General of Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada today ruled that all workers have a constitutional right to be represented in collective bargaining by an association of their choosing that is independent of the employer.

Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are excluded from the Public Service Labour Relations Act. Instead, they are required to address labour relations issues through the Staff Relations Representative Program (SRRP), an internal process lacking independence from the employer. The Court ruled that both the exclusion from the Act and the imposition of the SRRP violate the freedom of association protected under section 2(d) of the Charter, and that this violation is not a justifiable limitation under section 1 of the Charter.

The Court’s reasons emphasize the crucial role that collective bargaining plays in empowering workers:

“[o]nly by banding together in collective bargaining associations, thus strengthening their bargaining power with their employer, can [workers] meaningfully pursue their workplace goals”. […] Just as a ban on employee association impairs freedom of association, so does a labour relations process that substantially interferes with the possibility of having meaningful collective negotiations on workplace matters”.

The Court clarified its previous ruling on the constitutional right to collective bargaining, confirming that the test for a section 2(d) violation remains “substantial interference” with meaningful collective bargaining, rather than “effective impossibility”. The Court also rejected the Government’s interpretation of the “derivative” nature of the right to collectively bargain, reiterating that “collective bargaining is a necessary precondition to the meaningful exercise of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association”.

The Court’s decision in this case confirms what unions and workers’ rights advocates have long maintained: a representative process under the control or influence of the employer is directly contrary to the freedom of association and the constitutional right to collective bargaining. This ruling sets the stage for the Supreme Court’s highly anticipated decision in the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour case, which will determine whether the freedom of association also includes the right to strike.

Andrew Raven, Andrew Astritis and Morgan Rowe of our firm represented the Public Service Alliance of Canada, which appeared as intervener before the Supreme Court of Canada in support of the appeal.

On December 1, 2014, the Ottawa and District Labour Council hosted its annual Labour Appreciation Awards to recognize and celebrate the dedicated work of unions, members and activists in advancing workers’ rights.

In total, five awards were presented: Community Activist Award, Labour Pioneer Award, Health and Safety Activist Award, United Way Ottawa Ambassador and Labour Activist Award. We congratulate all the nominees and winners.

Along with the Ottawa and District Labour Council, this event was co-hosted by the Workers’ Health and Safety Centre, United Way Ottawa and Labour Community Services.

Wassim Garzouzi was proud to attend and support this sold out event.

The Toronto Star reports that 10,000 current and former Canada Post employees have received pay equity cheques from the Crown Corporation. The payouts are the result of almost three decades of human rights litigation and a landmark victory at the Supreme Court of Canada. The complaint was first filed in 1983 by the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) on behalf of 2300 clerical workers.

Canada Post has stated that it has now paid out to everyone for whom it has contact information. However, thousands more individuals could still be eligible. Canada Post is working with the Canada Revenue Agency to reach out to other individuals on its behalf, and is also planning on placing a series of newspaper ads to alert potential recipients. More information about the Canada Post pay equity payment process can be found here.

PSAC was represented by RavenLaw lawyers throughout the pay equity case, including Andrew Raven, James Cameron, David Yazbeck and Andrew Astritis at the Supreme Court of Canada, where the Court ruled unanimously in favour of PSAC in a rare oral ruling from the bench.