David Yazbeck is quoted in “Charter vetting challenge heading to Federal Court”, an article in the January 2015 edition of The Lawyers Weekly magazine. The article discusses the upcoming Federal Court case of Schmidt v A.G. Canada. The Applicant, Edgar Schmidt, a former Department of Justice lawyer, sued the government in 2012. The lawsuit alleges that the Minister of Justice was failing to live up to his responsibilities under s. 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act and s. 3 of the Canadian Bill of Rights to vet all regulations and government bills tabled or presented by a cabinet minister in the House of Commons, and report any inconsistencies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or Canadian Bill of Rights.

David Yazbeck is representing Mr. Schmidt in the Federal Court case.

David Yazbeck recently celebrated his 10^th year anniversary as the host of the Thursday Morning Special Blend on CKCU FM. The Thursday Morning Special Blend focuses on local arts and rights issues, with plenty of live local music and interesting interviews. David regularly has representatives from the local music community, GCTC, Amnesty International, Rod Phillips on wine, and more.  David started the show in 2004, inspired by his passions for music, other arts, and progressive politics. To celebrate the 10 year anniversary, David hosted a special live show on December 18 at the West End Well Café. You can listen to the 10^th anniversary show here.

“Clearly the arc bends increasingly towards workplace justice”: The Supreme Court of Canada today released a landmark decision in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, ruling that section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects workers’ right to strike. In bold and sweeping reasons on behalf of the Majority, Justice Abella outlined the historical, international, and jurisprudential foundations for this right, emphasizing that a right to strike is indispensable to meaningful collective bargaining.

The case itself dealt with legislation from Saskatchewan that granted public sector employers the unilateral authority to identify which employees were prohibited from participating in a strike because they performed ‘essential services’. This legislation – which closely resembles amendments subsequently made to federal public sector labour law – departed from the conventional approach to essential services legislation across the country, in which independent labour boards possess the authority to determine what services are essential, and which employees are required to perform those services.

The Supreme Court concluded that Saskatchewan’s legislation violates the right to strike as it significantly interferes with a meaningful process of collective bargaining and that this violation cannot be saved by section 1 of the Charter. The Court explained that there is no justification for granting public employers a unilateral right to limit the right of their employees to strike. The Court further held that the legislation in this case went well beyond what was necessary to provide essential services to the public: for example, the legislation permitted employers to require workers to perform non-essential duties, and it failed to provide an alternate dispute resolution mechanism for those workers who are determined to be essential.

RavenLaw congratulates the appellants and their counsel on this historic victory for workers.

Andrew Raven, Andrew Astritis, and Morgan Rowe from our firm represented the Public Service Alliance of Canada, who appeared as an intervener before the Supreme Court of Canada in support of the right to strike.

On Tuesday, January 6, 2015, Wassim Garzouzi participated on a Labour Law Panel at the University of Ottawa alongside co-panelists Graham Clarke of the Canada Industrial Relations Board (“CIRB”) and George Vuicic, of Hicks Morley. Following an arbitration simulation, the panel discussed the practice of labour law and answered questions from students.

The event was organized by Professor Suzanne Bouclin as part of the Dispute Resolution course at the Law Faculty of the University of Ottawa.

On the heels of its recent decision in Mounted Police Association of Ontario,[1] and with more distant roots in its judgments in BC Health Services[2] and Fraser,[3] the Supreme Court of Canada has breathed new life into section 2(d) of the Charter as it relates to the Canadian workplace. The Court’s decision marks a historic moment, not only for workers, but for the continued vitality of the rights protected by the Charter.

In Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan (“SFL”), the unions challenged legislation granting public employers in the province the unilateral right to declare workers as performing “essential services”, meaning that they could not participate in an otherwise lawful strike. The Supreme Court found that this legislation violated workers’ freedom of association under 2(d) of the Charter: writing for the majority, Justice Rosalie Abella held that the right to strike is an essential part of meaningful collective bargaining and is protected by 2(d), and further held that the essential services regime in Saskatchewan could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter because, among other things, there was no independent check on employers’ unilateral right to prevent workers from striking.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly overruled its prior holding in the Alberta Reference,[4] nearly 30 years earlier, that freedom of association did not protect the right to strike. The analysis of the Court in SFL relies heavily on the dissenting reasons of Chief Justice Dickson in Alberta Reference, adopting his conclusion that “effective constitutional protection of the associational interests of employees in the collective bargaining process requires concomitant protection of their freedom to withdraw collectively their services, subject to s. 1 of the Charter.”

The Court’s wholesale endorsement of Chief Justice Dickson’s dissent shows that the Charter is indeed a “living tree”, and the Court is not afraid to permit it to grow and develop over time. In her majority reasons, Justice Abella writes that, in now including the right to strike, “s. 2(d) has arrived at the destination sought by Dickson C.J. in the Alberta Reference”. This language—likening section 2(d) to a kind of traveller—is a bold affirmation that Charter rights are not stagnant and will be interpreted to give effect to their underlying values, even as our understanding and acceptance of those values evolves over time.

In this way, the judgment in SFL can be seen as further validation of the approach in BC Health Services and Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford:[5] when the Court is faced with compelling arguments supported by a strong evidentiary record, it is prepared to revisit its past conclusions in order to give life to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

[1] Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1

[2] Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27

[3] Health Services, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20

[4] Alberta Reference (Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313)

[5] Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72

On January 7 and 8, 2015, Andrew Astritis appeared in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to argue a judicial review application. The application seeks to overturn a decision of an arbitrator on the right of employees to accumulate vacation credits.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan (“SFL”) will be remembered primarily for its historic conclusion that freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes a protection for workers’ right to strike.

But the comprehensive reasons of the majority also offer strong confirmation of the persuasive role that international law and Canada’s international commitments play when interpreting Charter rights.

International Law and the Charter

In determining that the freedom of association protects the right to strike, the Supreme Court gave significant, substantive consideration to the development of the right to strike within international law.

The Court concluded that there is an emerging international consensus that meaningful collective bargaining requires a right to strike and that this consensus, when combined with similar historical and legal developments, required recognition of the right to strike within the Charter.

That international law plays some role in interpreting Charter rights comes as no surprise. The Supreme Court has long recognized that Charter rights should be interpreted consistently with Canada’s international human rights obligations. As the often-cited passage by former Chief Justice Dickson recognized:

…the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.

Without more specific guidance from the Supreme Court, however, the use of international instruments as interpretive tools has often been stalled by practical questions as to how they may be used and by significant resistance from the provincial and federal governments to their use in the first place.

In fact, before the courts in SFL, many of the government interveners argued that little weight should be given to the status of the right to strike internationally. They argued that the Charter does not incorporate Canada’s international commitments and that there is no obligation to constitutionally protect rights recognized in international law. They also suggested that courts should not rely on international instruments to which Canada is not a party.

Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decision

In its reasons, the Court soundly rejected all arguments to limit the persuasiveness or relevance of international law. Instead, the Court confirmed that international law plays a crucial role in interpreting rights under the Charter.

The Court’s reasons also offer a number of broader lessons about the use of international law going forward.

• First, international law, particularly in areas of growing international consensus, can and should play a central role in informing the evolving content of rights under the Charter. Developments in international law over time are, consequently, relevant when assessing whether to recognize rights in Canada. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had previously rejected this position.
• Second, courts should give consideration to a wide range of international instruments, even those which do not formally bind Canada. The Supreme Court looked beyond the well-established sources of Canadian legal obligations, such as international treaties which Canada has ratified, and relied on other authorities whose potential interpretive power had previously been unclear, including decisions of the International Labour Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Association, decisions made under the European Convention on Human Rights, and labour legislation and decisions from other countries.
• Finally, the Court recognized that the expertise of certain specialized international bodies will provide their decisions with “considerable persuasive weight.” The Court made this statement particularly with regards to the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association, suggesting that its decisions will continue to guide future labour cases under section 2(d).

Conclusion

While some questions may remain in terms of how to practically apply international instruments as interpretive aids, the above principles – and the Supreme Court’s unequivocal support for their application – provide clear and decisive confirmation that international law considerations will form an essential part of Charter claims going forward.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

Our firm is renewing its partnership with the University of Ottawa and continues its commitment and funding to the Raven, Cameron, Ballantyne & Yazbeck LLP/s.r.l. Human Rights/Social Justice Internship. This exciting opportunity provides an excellent and meaningful summer work experience to students who are particularly interested in issues pertaining to social justice, human rights or equality rights. This is the 10th consecutive year that this paid internship has been sponsored by RavenLaw.

This is a program that we are very proud of as it gives students excellent experience in these areas but also provides legal support to social justice organizations. This year, the host organizations include the Workers History Museum.

Students seeking information about the internship should contact Chelsea Paradis. If your organization works in the areas of social justice and human rights and you are interested in having an intern in the future, please contact David Yazbeck at 613-567-2901.

Nowadays most employees spend at least a portion of their workday using a computer, raising important privacy questions of what kinds of computer surveillance employers can implement on their employees’ work computers and under what circumstances.

Questions relating to employer surveillance – when? why? how much is too much? – are long-standing issues in both unionized and non-unionized workplaces. Traditionally, decision-makers have been sharply divided over when employers can implement surreptitious video surveillance over their employees, for example, and then rely on videotape evidence for later discipline.

This division has largely centred on a fundamental disagreement between decision-makers as to whether employees have a right to privacy in the workplace. This same disagreement carried over into the early computer surveillance decisions, where courts and arbitrators routinely found that employees had no expectation of privacy in work computers and upheld discipline and even termination based on non-work computer use.

Protecting the “Biographical Core”: R v Cole

That perception was shaken by a number of cases in the early 2000’s, but none moreso than the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 2011 and the Supreme Court’s 2012 decisions in R v Cole. While Cole dealt with a challenge to the search and seizure of an employee’s work computer by police, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to comment more broadly on employees’ right to privacy in their work computers. The Court found that an expectation of privacy could be inferred where personal computer use was permitted or reasonably expected:

Computers that are reasonably used for personal purposes – whether found in the workplace or the home – contain information that is meaningful, intimate, and touching on the user’s biographical core. Vis-à-vis the state, everyone in Canada is constitutionally entitled to expect privacy in personal information of this kind.

While workplace policies and practices may diminish an individual’s expectation of privacy in a work computer, these sorts of operational realities do not in themselves remove the expectation entirely: The nature of the information at stake exposes the likes, interest, thoughts, activities, and searches for information of the individual user.

Implications for Employees: Right to Privacy at Work

While the long-term implications of Cole are not yet clear – particularly given that the Court declined to comment specifically on employer computer surveillance or the ability of an employer to seize and search a work computer – decision-makers have begun to adopt its reasoning to find a breach of employee privacy rights when employers engage in surreptitious, unjustified computer surveillance. For example:

• The British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner found an employer internet usage audit to be a breach of privacy where the employee had never attempted to hide his internet usage and had never been approached about it by the employer prior to the audit.
• The Alberta Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner found that an employer had contravened privacy legislation when it installed keystroke logging software on an employee’s computer to monitor productivity. The Commissioner particularly noted the availability of less intrusive measures and the failure to limit the scope of the employer’s investigation.

These examples aside, however, decision-makers have yet to fully address the question of what Cole will mean for the traditional approaches to employer surveillance. While older cases extended employers a nearly unfettered right to set ethical, professional and operational standards for their workplace, Cole recognized that employer policies and practices may diminish a privacy right but cannot remove it entirely. Whether future decision-makers will accept a robust conception of employee privacy rights or will return to tests largely based on employer reasonableness remains to be seen.

A Right Without A Remedy

In any event, the suggestion in some post-Cole case law that employers ought to undertake less intrusive steps prior to surveilling employee computers raises a separate, perplexing question: what happens if employers don’t?

So far, Privacy Commissioners, in large part because of the nature of their authority, have provided for little in the way of remedy beyond ordering that the surveillance cease. For employees whose privacy was breached or who have been disciplined as a result of this intrusion, this may provide little comfort.

More recently, the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench upheld the decision of a labour arbitrator which relied in part on an employee’s privacy interest in her work computer to reduce a termination for inappropriate email use to a suspension.

Other decision-makers, however, have found that an employer’s violation of privacy rights cannot lessen the seriousness of inappropriate work computer use. In these circumstances, it has been suggested that decision-makers can do no more than recommend that the employer take privacy interests into account in the future.

The decisions in Cole took significant steps towards changing how we discuss employee privacy in relation to work computers. As the trial judge in Cole stated, office computers are much like office desks and personal papers much like personal computer files. However, until decision-makers develop a substantive way to provide remedies for the breach of an employee’s privacy interest in his or her work computer, the change in how we talk about privacy rights at work cannot translate into protection for employees.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

On January 13, 2015, Daniel Tucker-Simmons, an articling student at RavenLaw, won a case before the Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now). ACORN has been fighting for years to improve housing conditions in the low – mid income areas in Ottawa for its members and others.

The case involved a landlord’s failure to repair a 150-meter stretch of walkway which had fallen into disrepair, creating a serious safety hazard for residents. Despite years of repair requests by residents, including ACORNmember Mavis Finnamore, prior landlords and the current landlords did not repair the walkway.

After Ms. Finnamore filed an application with the Board, RavenLaw provided Daniel’s services to represent ACORN member Mavis Finnamore at the Board hearing. Daniel’s victory before the Board means that the landlord will have to pay to fix the walkway. The victory is also the latest in a series of big wins for ACORN’s housing justice campaign, which stretches back to 2011 and has helped residents achieve over $200,000 in rent abatements and repair work.

Read more about the case on ACORN’s blog.