On June 11, David Yazbeck will be moderating a Lancaster House Conference on “The ABCs of IMEs: When are they useful, when are the required?” The conference will discuss the ins and outs of employer requests for independent medical examinations (“IMEs”) to verify or obtain information about an employee’s medical condition. The panel will discuss the ground rules for employer requests for IMEs, whether such requests are becoming more common, whether IMEs should be sought only as a “last resort”, how the parties can ensure that privacy rights are being respected in the IME process, and what consequences an employee may face on refusing an IME.

More information about the conference can be found here.

David Yazbeck has been named an Advisor to FOLKRUM, Ottawa’s community music venue. FOLKRUM is an independent, not-for-profit organization working toward the creation of a creativity hub and music facility to serve Ottawa, Outaouais, the valley and surrounding areas.

On May 12, 2015,  RavenLaw lawyers Raphaëlle Laframboise-Carignan, Morgan Rowe and Dayna Steinfeld will be participating in a panel discussion on disability insurance issues as part of an International Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/ Fibromyalgia (ME/FM) Awareness Day event hosted by MESH Ottawa. Topics of discussion will include the duty to accommodate, Canada Pension Plan Disability, and short-term and long-term disability benefits. The panel will also feature Margaret Parlor, President of the National ME/FM Action Network, who will provide facts and background on Fibromyalgia and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.

More information about the event, including how to register, can be found here.

In a recent arbitration decision, Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 464 v Ottawa Hospital, Arbitrator Mary Ellen Cummings found that the Ottawa Hospital’s application of its short-term sick leave benefits discriminated against employees with chronic disabilities, contrary to the Human Rights Code. The collective agreement language at issue in the case is common throughout most of the hospital sector in Ontario, and this decision sets an important precedent for how absences due to chronic illnesses must be handled in the province.

Background

The case related to sick leave benefits under the Hospitals of Ontario Disability Income Plan (“HOODIP”). Under HOODIP, employees have up to 15 weeks of short-term sick pay benefits for each period of absence. Article 16.03 in the Collective Agreement states: “No sick pay benefit is payable under HOODIP for the first fifteen hours of absence for the sixth and subsequent period(s) of absence in the same fiscal year”. The Ottawa Hospital applied this rule such that any absences separated by three weeks or more were treated as distinct “periods of absence”, even if the absences were all due to the same chronic illness. The Ontario Public Service Employees Union filed a policy grievance against the Hospital, arguing that this interpretation of “period of absence” discriminated against employees who have chronic illnesses that periodically reoccur (e.g. migraines, Crohn’s Disease).

Arbitrator’s Decision

The Arbitrator found that the use of a three-week gap to identify distinct periods of absence had an adverse impact on employees with chronic illnesses compared to other employees receiving sick leave benefits. Employees with frequent, short absences due to a chronic illness will reach their sixth and subsequent “period of absence” more quickly than other employees, due to the nature of their disability. Treating these absences as a “new ailment”, simply because they were separated by three weeks, failed to address the circumstances of employees with chronic illnesses.

Arbitrator Cummings further found that this discrimination was not justified as reasonable and bona fide. She rejected the Hospital’s argument that it would be too onerous to determine whether absences were due to a chronic disability, holding: “looking at the individual needs of employees with disabilities and determining to what extent accommodation is required is the minimum required of all employers under the Code.”

The grievance was allowed, and the Hospital was directed to stop counting absences separated by more than three weeks as a distinct period of absence when the employee has a chronic illness. The Arbitrator further directed the employer to look at absences of employees with chronic illnesses and determine whether the employee can be accommodated, and if so how. She emphasized that accommodation may take many possible forms, and so a single remedy would be inappropriate.

This Award sets an important precedent, not only for collective agreements in the hospital sector with similar language, but also more broadly for treatment of employees’ absences when they are due to a chronic, recurring illness. Arbitrator Cummings’ decision provides strong confirmation that there is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach to managing employees’ attendance, and employers must look at each individual’s circumstances and needs.

The Union was represented by Wassim Garzouzi and Amanda Montague-Reinholdt from Raven, Cameron, Ballantyne & Yazbeck LLP/s.r.l.

On May 13, David Yazbeck will be speaking at the Lancaster House Halifax Human Rights and Labour Law Conference.  David is participating in a panel called “Don’t Shoot the Messenger: Dealing with whistleblowers in the modern workplace”.  The panel will examine whistleblower legislation, discuss human rights protections, and explore the issue of reprisals.

Andrew Astritis recently spoke at a conference hosted by the Canadian Foundation for Labour Rights that examined three recent decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada on the issues of labour rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Andrew’s presentation addressed the implications of the Court’s decision in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan on essential services legislation. The conference was organized in conjunction with the Canadian Labour Congress Legal Challenges Committee and the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers.

On May 7, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal issued an important decision granting over $310,000 in remedies for discriminatory practices engaged in by the Canada Border Services Agency in violation of sections 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. In an earlier decision, the Tribunal found that the complainant, Levan Turner, was discriminated against by CBSA on the basis of his race, colour, and perceived disability of obesity.

In the remedial decision, the Tribunal found that CBSA wilfully deprived Mr. Turner of employment opportunities, conduct which was deliberate, driven by prejudice and permeated with an ulterior motive to deny Mr. Turner an opportunity to continue being employed with CBSA.

The Tribunal ordered that CBSA compensate Mr. Turner for his lost wages over a ten-year period, anticipated lost wages for the years 2015 to 2019, $15,000 for pain and suffering, and an additional $15,000 compensation arising from CBSA’s wilful discrimination.

Mr. Turner was represented by David Yazbeck of RavenLaw.

This month, Andrew Astritis and Wassim Garzouzi participated in an upper-year labour arbitration course at the University of Ottawa Law School. Andrew and Wassim enjoyed serving as panelists for the year-end labour arbitration moot and providing students with comments and feedback on their presentations.

RavenLaw gratefully acknowledges the contribution to this blog by Taylor Akin, Student-At-Law

By now, many of us have heard of Jennifer Huculak-Kimmel, the Canadian mother who was billed $950,000 when she unexpectedly gave birth while on vacation in Hawaii. Her baby was delivered nine weeks early by emergency C-section and had to be hospitalized for two months. Prior to leaving for vacation, Huculak-Kimmel had purchased travel insurance with Blue Cross and was cleared to fly by her doctor.  Blue Cross denied her coverage due to an alleged pre-existing condition. Huculak-Kimmel had contracted a bladder infection four months into her pregnancy and Blue Cross argued that this pre-existing condition made her pregnancy high risk and nullified her health insurance coverage.

In determining whether health insurance coverage is owed in these circumstances, recent Canadian judgments have applied the reasonable expectations doctrine. The British Columbia Supreme Court decided a similar (albeit less financially devastating) case that occurred in 2011. In Turpin v Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2011 BCSC 1162, Sandra Turpin experienced abdominal pain two weeks before a trip. She sought the advice of three different doctors and was prescribed antibiotics. She then purchased travel insurance and travelled to South California. Shortly after her trip began, Turpin felt unwell and attended a walk-in clinic. When a new prescription did not ease the pain, she spent 5 days confined to hospital.  Upon returning to Canada, she underwent an appendectomy. The family incurred just over $27,000 in medical expenses while on vacation that the insurance company refused to cover due to the alleged pre-existing medical condition.

In evaluating Turpin’s entitlement to coverage, Justice Echlin considered the reasonable expectations principle.  Although a clause in the health insurance policy excluded preexisting conditions, the court found that both parties reasonably expected Turpin to be covered on her trip. Justice Echlin followed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Chilton v. Co-Operators General Insurance Company, (1997)  32 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), where the Court of Appeal stated that “coverage limitations in insurance policies that conflict with reasonable expectations are not enforced even though the limitations are both explicit and unambiguous.”

Justice Echlin reached a similar conclusion: “Ms. Turpin was not eligible for medical coverage because she suffered an irregularity in her health, three days before the policy issued. The medical coverage is nullified. That is not what the parties expected. I find they expected that Ms. Turpin would be so covered.”

The question that arises in the Huculak-Kimmel case is whether the parties (that is, both the insurer and the insured) reasonably expected that the insured would be covered by her travel insurance in these circumstances. If so, does this reasonable expectation also extend to the insured’s baby?  It will be interesting to see how her case unfolds given this recent judicial willingness to hold insurance companies accountable for that which is reasonably expected – despite exclusionary clauses.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

The Federal Court of Appeal recently issued a decision overhauling the state of federal employment law. In Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2015 FCA 17, the Court  rejected the generally accepted approach to unjust dismissal complaints under the Canada Labour Code (“Code”), which applies to workers who are employed in federally regulated industries. The decision in Wilson has profound implications for non-unionized federally regulated employees. Mr. Wilson is currently seeking leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Background on termination of employment of unionized and non-unionized employees

Unionized workers can only be dismissed with just cause

For most unionized workers, terms and conditions of employment are governed by collective agreements which include a requirement that the employer only terminate an employee where there is just cause for dismissal. Just cause is a high threshold for an employer to meet and provides substantial protection for unionized workers.

Non-unionized federal workers cannot be dismissed “unjustly”

Section 240 of the Code provides non-unionized federal workers with the right to make “unjust dismissal” complaints, provided they have been employed for at least 12 months and they allege that they have been dismissed “unjustly”. The Code also provides statutory remedies for federal workers who are dismissed unjustly, including reinstatement to employment, which are not available to non-unionized provincial workers.

Non-unionized provincial workers can be dismissed without cause

At common law, non-unionized employees who work for provincially regulated employers – the vast majority of employers in Canada – can be dismissed without cause provided that employers provide reasonable notice of termination, or pay in lieu or reasonable notice. A dismissal that is both without cause and without reasonable notice is a wrongful dismissal. Read more about termination in the provincial sphere here.

The Pre-Wilson Approach to Unjust Dismissal Complaints under the Code

Prior to Wilson, there was an established line of cases holding that federal employers could only dismiss employees for cause, similar to the just cause protections provided for in collective agreements. Leading employment law scholars, Innis Christie and Geoffrey England, have explained that the Code’s unjust dismissal provisions were intended to:

“provide the non-unionized employee with substantially similar protections against unjust discharge as the unionized employee enjoys under a collective agreement.”

However, Code adjudicators have disagreed on this point and there are conflicting decisions on whether the Code permits dismissals on a without cause basis. As Code adjudicators are bound by decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal, Wilson settles the disagreement, unless the Supreme Court of Canada grants leave to appeal and weighs in on the issue.

Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd

A Code adjudicator determined that AECL had violated the Code by terminating Wilson on a without cause basis. AECL applied for judicial review of this decision at the Federal Court, and the Federal Court overturned the adjudicator’s decision. Mr. Wilson appealed the Federal Court’s decision to the Federal Court of Appeal.

A dismissal without cause is not “unjust”

In Wilson, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that:

• a dismissal without cause is not automatically unjust under the Code;
• this is consistent with the common law of employment, which allows for dismissal without cause so long as the reasonable notice requirement is met; and
• the Code cannot be interpreted as giving non-unionized employees a “right to the job” or attempting to place unionized and non-unionized employees in the same position.

Code adjudicators must determine if a dismissal is “unjust” in all of the circumstances

The Court also explained the role of Code adjudicators in unjust dismissal complaints:

• it is up to Code adjudicators to look into the circumstances of each case to determine if the dismissal was “unjust”; and
• adjudicators do not have “free rein” to find a dismissal unjust on any basis, although the fact that an employer has paid an employee severance pay does not preclude a finding that the dismissal was unjust.

However, beyond commenting that “unjust” is a term that “sits alongside and gathers much, if not all, of its meaning from well-established common law and arbitral cases concerning dismissal”, the Court declined to interpret the meaning of “unjust”. It will now be up to Code adjudicators to determine the meaning of “unjust” through the development of case law.

Supreme Court will decide whether to weigh in on this dramatic change for federal employees

The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision marks a major departure from an established line of cases, and creates considerable uncertainty in the law going forward. The Federal Court of Appeal left open the meaning of “unjust”, the very basis for section 240 complaints, which may now make it more difficult for a worker to assess the merits of an unjust dismissal complaint. Mr. Wilson’s leave application will thus be closely followed by federal workers and their advocates, who undoubtedly hope the Supreme Court will intervene on this important issue.

Some of the questions that may be raised, if the appeal is heard by the Supreme Court, include:

• What, if any, differences are there between a common law wrongful termination and an unjust dismissal under the Code?
• Is it contrary to the policy reasons for section 240 of the Code to permit terminations “without cause”?
• Will reinstatement remain available as a remedy for unjust dismissal complaints under the Code, if employers are now permitted to terminate without cause? If so, under what circumstances will it be ordered?

It is hoped that an appeal before the Supreme Court will bring clarity to these issues, and resolve them in a manner that is consistent with the protections Parliament intended to afford to federally regulated employees.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]