On August 19, 2020, Morgan Rowe will present a seminar on returning to work during the COVID-19 pandemic. Morgan will discuss employees’ rights while returning to work, with a specific focus on the disability rights of employees and their family members.

The workshop is presented by Reach Canada. Reach provides educational programs and independent legal referral services that address the rights and interests of persons with disabilities

Pre-registration is required for this videoconference seminar. More information, including on how to register, may be found here.

Ravenlaw gratefully acknowledges the contribution of this post by articling student Claire Michela.

Regulated in Ontario since 1993, midwives are an overwhelmingly female-dominated profession represented by their Association of Midwives (AOM). Regulation was a proud moment for midwives, as it was a public recognition of their contributions to Ontario’s health care system. Recently, the Divisional Court found that the Ministry of Health (MOH)’s decision to raise the wages of midwives slowly, compared to other health care workers, amounts to systemic pay discrimination.

In 1993, the MOH and AOM worked together to develop funding principles to guide midwives’ future pay increases. Based on a third-party assessment, the AOM and MOH decided that doctors working in Community Health Centres (CHCs) had comparable levels of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions to Midwives, and the two groups should be paid on par.

But, starting in 2004, midwives’ wages were frozen and negotiations became strained. As similarly situated CHC doctors’ wages continued to increase, midwives’ pay was minimally increased for a number of years. As the pay gap broadened, the AOM filed a human rights complaint for gender discrimination in 2013.

In 2018, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario concluded that the MOH’s refusal to negotiate fair pay increases was discriminatory. This finding of discrimination meant that gender was a factor in midwives’ lower pay compared to similarly situated health care workers.

Despite the Tribunal’s decision, the MOH still could not agree on an appropriate amount to compensate midwives for years of discriminatory under-payment. The case returned to the Tribunal, which decided that the MOH must provide a 20% pay increase retroactive to 2011, human rights damages for those who signed on to the complaint, and interest to compensate midwives for lost time.

The MOH was unsatisfied and brought both Tribunal decisions to the Divisional Court for judicial review. At the Divisional Court, the MOH tried to argue that there was no pay discrimination because the midwives’ gender was not a factor in the MOH’s decision to pay midwives less than CHC doctors. However, the Court’s decision reminds the MOH that in human rights cases, intent to discriminate is never required.

The Divisional Court found the MOH’s arguments about why the Tribunal decisions were unreasonable to be “disingenuous” because they “fail to engage with the allegations of adverse gender impacts on midwives and ignore the systemic dimensions of the claim.”

Discrimination is systemic when the policies or practices of organizations result in an adverse impact for a protected group. In this case, the MOH’s pay policies were discriminatory toward midwives because their pay was raised remarkably slowly (an adverse impact) compared to similarly situated health care workers.

Systemic discrimination has been a topic of public debate recently, as the Black Lives Matter movement has gained traction around the world. The case of the pay of midwives in Ontario demonstrates how systemic discrimination is a subtle form of discrimination that can creep in over time and that it may be unintentional. However, as noted by the court, in human rights law, intention is not required for systemic discrimination to exist.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

The implementation of physical distancing measures in the face of the global COVID-19 pandemic has raised a number of issues for workers with family obligations. Many workers are now being asked to work from home on a regular basis. At the same time, schools and childcare institutions have been closed and are only in the process of reopening, with the future success of these efforts remaining uncertain. Other workers face the need to care for sick family members, preventing them from fully meeting their work obligations.

Human Rights law, which has been found to provide certain protections to allow workers to balance their family and work obligations, can play an important role in navigating these issues.

How am I protected as a parent and an employee?

Human Rights law seeks to protect people from adverse consequences flowing from the fact that they exhibit one of the protected characteristics enumerated by the legislation. In this case, the protected characteristic is called “family status”.

The protection from discrimination on the basis of family status has been interpreted to protect people from adverse consequences in their employment flowing from their family care obligations. What is protected, however, may depend on whether your employer is federally or provincially regulated.

In Ontario, it is generally enough to show that the employer’s rule has a substantial negative effect on the parent/child or family care relationship and the responsibilities that attach to it. In assessing whether there a prima facie case of discrimination has been made out, the decision maker can look at the supports available to the claimant, but the claimant is not required to exhaust all options in attempting to self-accommodate.

Case law from the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario provides a helpful foundation for parents juggling work and family obligations, including the obligation to assist their children with e-learning and other activities meant to replace school while schools are closed in response to COVID-19. Parents will be expected to make reasonable efforts to meet all of their obligations, but employers will also be expected to make reasonable concessions and allow for accommodations that will help parents to meet their obligations.

Employees who are federally regulated may have a more onerous test to meet. The Federal Court of Appeal has stated that an employer is only obligated to accommodate a family obligation when it arises from a “legal obligation”, as opposed to a “personal choice”. The implications of this requirement in the COVID-19 context remain to be seen, particularly given decisions from arbitrators and human rights tribunals, such as the arbitration award in SMS Equipment, indicating that additional requirements in the family status context are not appropriate.

A Recent Example

Arbitrator Jesin recently dealt with a COVID-19-related family status grievance. The grievor, who works in Sault-St. Marie and lives in Michigan, had a unique situation brought on by COVID-19. While he was not required to self-isolate for fourteen days after entering Canada due to an exemption in the regulations, the employer had a rule that required it, effectively making it impossible to both work and see his young children.

Arbitrator Jesin held that it was unreasonable for the employer to apply its policy without accommodating the grievor’s family status. He suggested that the employer adapt the policy to fit better with the grievor’s circumstances and that it might consider other precautions such as increased PPE or restricting him from going to COVID-19 “hot spots” in the US.

This decision is notable for the fact that it does not consider the issue of whether it was the grievor’s choice to maintain his custody arrangement or take up residence in Canada. The duty to accommodate was taken as a given. The decision is an example of Ontario arbitrators’ willingness to go straight to the question of accommodation where an employee has experienced adverse consequences as a result of a work rule and their family realities.

Addressing Family Status Concerns

If you are having difficulty keeping up with both work and childcare obligations, you can ask your employer to accommodate you. This may mean a later start time, more reduced hours, or other accommodation measures that may be necessary in the circumstances. If the employer refuses to provide any accommodation, though not necessarily the requested accommodation, it will have to show that not only does the requested accommodation would interfere with a bona fide occupational requirement and that it would experience undue hardship if forced to accommodate.

If you have any questions about these issues or your employer has refused to provide an accommodation it may be time to contact an employment lawyer or your union.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without an assessment of your individual circumstances.]

A recent decision of the Manitoba Court of Queens Bench has found that legislation which purported to cap wage increases for unionized public sector employees infringed the Charter right to freedom of association.

Manitoba’s Progressive Conservative Party was elected in April 2016 and, shortly thereafter, Cabinet recommended adopting wage-freezing legislation modeled on legislation that had previously been used to limit increases to public sector wages in Nova Scotia. The legislation was passed within a year. The Public Service Sustainability Act (PSSA) created what it called a “sustainability period”. This meant that for the first two years following the expiration of a collective agreement no wage increases could be granted or awarded by an arbitrator. In the third year, increases were to be capped at 0.75% and 1.0% in the fourth.

The legislation received royal assent but was not proclaimed into force. Some speculated that the reason for its non-proclamation was to avoid the possibility that it would be held to be unconstitutional. However, the unions that challenged the legislation provided extensive evidence that, despite the non-proclamation of the legislation, the threat of the legislation’s ability to retroactively roll back negotiated wage increases hung over all collective bargaining tables, and was repeatedly adverted to by government and employer negotiators. Nearly all of the unions who were parties to the Charter challenge had concluded collective agreements with wage increases in line with the PSSA but indicated that their acceptance was conditional on the constitutionality of the PSSA and that they were signed “under duress”.

The constitutional challenge relied on the developing jurisprudence around section 2(d) of the Charter which guarantees freedom of association. Freedom of association has developed to include a right to collective bargaining free from substantial government interference and a right to strike. The most recent decisions from the Supreme Court are the 2015 trilogy of Mounted Police Association of Ontario, Meredith, and Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, as well as the Court’s subsequent decision in British Columbia Teachers’ Federation.  Those decisions advanced the law of freedom of association significantly in positive directions for unions. However, the Meredith decision found that wage restraint legislation imposed to address economic concerns arising out of the 2008 financial crisis was permissible in the context of the labour relations regime in place at the RCMP. Subsequently, appellate courts across the country dismissed constitutional challenges to that same federal wage restraint legislation.

A Significant Win for Freedom of Association

The Manitoba Federation of Labour case is important. It provides a clear and systematic analytical framework for dealing with legislation which freezes or limits increases on public sector wages achieved through collective bargaining.

The Court’s findings can be broken up into four parts:

1. The fact that the legislation was not proclaimed into force did not prevent the court from reviewing its constitutionality.
2. There is no duty on legislators to consult unions prior to legislating with respect to matters falling within the purview of collective bargaining. However, consultation or the lack thereof may be relevant in determining whether the legislation is justified.
3. The legislation substantially interfered with collective bargaining: monetary concerns are important concerns for union members and removing them from consideration in collective bargaining significantly compromises a unions ability to bargain on other issues.
4. The legislation could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter: general reduction in budget deficits, absent some emergency, was not a pressing and substantial objective. Additionally, the lack of consultation indicated that the government had not meaningfully explored other options which is required to meet the minimal impairment requirement of the proportionality branch of the test for justification under section 1 of the

In comparing the Manitoba legislation to the Federal legislation in Meredith, the Court noted that a significant difference between the two pieces of legislation was that the federal legislation sought to impose salary increases comparable to those that had been negotiated for comparable bargaining units in the public sector. Also, in this case, the legislation was imposed so as to have an effect on future collective bargaining rather than to provide certainty to bargaining that had been ongoing. The Court found that the enactment of the PSSA had wide-reaching consequences on labour relations and substantially interfered with a meaningful process of collective bargaining and thus infringed section 2(d) of the Charter.

Notably, the Court found that the government had failed to justify the Charter infringement at the first stage of the Oakes test. It emphasized that Courts should look with a large degree of skepticism on “dollars versus rights” controversies. The unions pointed to the fact that the government had introduced tax cuts at the same time as it pled poverty. The court found, upon a detailed review of various budgetary reports, that there was no budgetary crisis that could constitute a pressing and substantial objective. Courts rarely rely on this branch of the Oakes test to find that constitutional infringements cannot be justified. As such, this can be read as a striking indictment of legislating wage restraint for unionized employees for ideological or convenience reasons.

For the sake of completeness, the Court went on to consider the balance of the Oakes test including whether the PSSA minimally impaired the union members’ freedom of association while accomplishing its stated objective of limiting government expenditures. In determining whether the government employed the least-infringing option, the Court looked at the process that led up to the adoption of the legislation.  The government had indicated to the unions at all times prior to the passage of the legislation that this was the only option it would consider. The Court suggested that the government could have simply reduced budgets at government-funded employers and allowed bargaining to transpire in that context. The unions had gone so far as to propose less-impairing alternatives prior to the enactment of the legislation but the government had ignored their proposals.

The Court declared that the relevant sections of the PSSA violated the Charter, could not be justified and were thus of no force and effect.

Takeaways for Unions

There are significant practical lessons to be had from the unions’ success in this case in how to deal with legislated austerity measures for public sector wages.

First, it appears that the tactic of ratifying collective agreements conditionally with the proviso that it was done “under duress” can support the conclusion that collective bargaining was substantially interfered with and may allow the unions to later challenge the collective agreements, which were concluded under the threat of the legislation.

Second, the unions presented a united front with all affected public-sector unions working together to challenge the legislation fronted by the Manitoba Federation of Labour. This strategy appears to have assisted in presenting robust factual evidence and providing the Court with a complete picture of all facets of the government’s application of its policies under the legislation in negotiations with various bargaining units.

Third, while the decision confirms that pre-legislative consultation is not required for wage restraint legislation, it suggests that such consultation may assist the government in justifying any resulting infringement. It may be advisable for unions facing down impending wage-restraint legislation to make concrete alternative proposals which can be relied on later to show that the legislation was not the least rights-impairing option to address the government’s concerns.

Fourth, the unions brought forward significant amounts of expert evidence from labour relations scholars on a variety of issues including the importance of the leverage gained from being able to negotiate on monetary issues, the effect of these restrictions on the relationships between unions and their members, the impact of such legislation on the ongoing relationships between unions and management, the effect of the legislation on strike leverage, and consequences for government finances. The Court relied extensively on the expert reports provided by the union, demonstrating the importance of developing a significant evidentiary basis on both the section 2(d) and section 1 Charter issues.

This decision will hopefully chill efforts by governments to impose wage restraint through legislation. If not, it provides an effective roadmap for similar constitutional challenges to newly introduced legislation that will curtail bargaining rights.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without an assessment of your individual circumstances.]

Ravenlaw gratefully acknowledges the contribution of this post by articling student Simcha Walfish.

When the land border between Canada and the United States closed in March, thousands of people who make the daily commute to work across the border were left in a difficult situation.

United Steelworkers Local 2251 v Algoma Steel Inc. deals with one such person, a machinist apprentice at a steel plant in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario.

Each day the employee made the approximately 30-minute commute from his home in Chippewa County in Northern Michigan to the plant in Sault Ste. Marie. Because he was crossing the border for employment reasons, he was exempted from the border closure and from the mandatory 14-day period of self-isolation. However, his employer wanted to go further in creating a “Covid free” worksite. It implemented a policy that any of its employees who enter the country must isolate for 14 days before attending work.

This employee has custody of his two young children on the weekends and they would not be entitled to cross the border with him. This made it impossible for him to enter into Canada fourteen days prior to entering the workplace. The Union challenged the application of the self-isolation policy and its impact on this employee.

The arbitrator reasoned that, while this policy would generally be reasonable, it would not be reasonable to apply it without considering obligations under the Human Rights Code to accommodate family status.  In this “unusual case,” the policy forced the employee “to make the difficult choice of having access to his two young children or to make a living.” The arbitrator also noted the fairly low rates of COVID-19 in the employee’s home area.

The Arbitrator concluded that the “competing legitimate rights” must be balanced. Instead of the blanket ban on employees crossing the border, the employer could assign him to work separately from other employees, require that he wear PPE, and take extra social distancing and sanitizing protocols. Consulting with the Union, it could consider mandatory testing and even restricting him from travel to designated COVID-19 “hot spots” in the United States.

While governments and employers have taken sweeping and necessary action, this case is a helpful reminder that the approach to fighting the pandemic cannot disregard important worker and human rights protections. Here, a nuanced resolution was possible in a relatively short period of time, highlighting the importance of unions in advocating for their members as we navigate the COVID-19 workplace.

If you have questions or concerns about the implications of COVID-19 on your employment, please call 613-567-2901 or email info@ravenlaw.com. If you are a member of a union, please contact them directly for assistance in dealing with your workplace issue.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]

On September 25, 2020, Jessica Greenwood will speak at the annual Kingston and the 1000 Islands Legal Conference. She will participate in a panel addressing employment litigation issues arising due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

This year’s conference is proceeding virtually. The conference is hosted by the Frontenac Law Association.

On September 10, 2020, Alison McEwen spoke at the Ottawa Six-Minute Employment Lawyer workshop, presented by the County of Carleton Law Association. Alison spoke on trends in the notice periods awarded in wrongful dismissal cases, including increases in notice periods for older workers.

On September 17, 2020, Andrew Astritis spoke at the Osgoode Hall Professional Development conference on Class Actions: Critical and Emerging Issues. Andrew participated in the panel on “#MeToo Comes to Class Actions”.

Andrew is part of the team at RavenLaw that has been representing current and former members of the Canadian Armed Forces in the class action involving sexual misconduct in the military, which was settled in 2019.

The COVID-19 pandemic, its economic impact, and the recent protests regarding the systemic oppression of people of colour have all highlighted the need for robust protections for workers in Canada. As protests continue around the world, we must reflect on systemic racism in Canada. Throughout Canadian society, structural inequalities create vulnerability that manifests in precarious employment. Precarious employment has many definitions, but generally references employment that is uncertain, low paying, and with limited benefits and protections. If we hope to eliminate precarious employment, we need additional protections for workers.

Ontario Reduces Protections for Employees During the Pandemic

The early socio-demographic data in Ottawa shows that racialized groups and immigrants are over-represented in COVID-19 diagnoses compared to their relative population size. Diverse communities in Ottawa have rates of COVID-19 almost twice of those communities with the least diversity. Similar trends are being reported across the country. The economic effects of coronavirus are also being borne by precarious workers.

The existing legislation governing employment relationships in Canada does not prevent precarious employment. As a result, many employers rely on precarious employment as part of their business model. While there has been some progress in holding employers accountable, many businesses that form part of the ‘gig’ economy have exploited this model. We saw this recently with Foodora’s exit from Canada following an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision that would have allowed its employees to unionize.

While gaps already existed in employment legislation, some protections for workers have been removed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  For example, the Ontario government recently amended the Employment Standards Act with a new regulation creating Infectious Disease Emergency Leave. This regulation essentially prevents employees from claiming constructive dismissal under the Employment Standards Act when their hours are reduced or eliminated for an extended period due to COVID-19.

Migrant Workers: A Case Study in Precarious Employment

While precarious employment can create vulnerability, it also compounds vulnerability that may already exist. The spread of COVID-19 within the migrant worker community is an example of compounded vulnerability: Migrant workers are an essential component of Ontario’s commercial agriculture, but they have long been a vulnerable and marginalized community as a result of several factors, including their immigration status, employment conditions, and exclusion from some labour relations legislation. In Ontario, agricultural workers are governed by a separate labour relations statute with fewer protections than the one that covers most Ontario employees. In late May 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 began in southwestern Ontario, and by June, at least 187 migrant workers across southwestern Ontario had tested positive for COVID-19. By July, it was reported that almost 1,000 migrant farm workers have tested positive for COVID-19.

The Role of Unions in Preventing Precarious Employment

Marginalized communities are more likely to work in precarious, low-paying, and part-time employment. The data so far has shown that individuals with post-secondary education and high-earning dual income households are more likely to be able to work from home, therefore they have a lower likelihood of work interruption because of the pandemic.

One of the ways workers’ employment conditions can be protected is through unions. Unions can use the strength of a united collective to push for better working conditions, higher salaries, and job protections. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown just how important these rights are for workers. While some precarious workers are unionized, many are not.

You can learn more about employment rights and how labour organization movements have protected workers through the Canadian Human Rights Museum’s exhibit Rights on the Job, on now until October 2020.

What Now?

All workers have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, whether they are on the front lines, risking their lives to protect and provide for their communities, working from home to help stop the spread of COVID-19, or have had their work hours reduced or eliminated. All workers deserve to be protected. No workers should have to rely on precarious employment.

As a community, we must better protect precarious workers. This can include supporting the labour movement, encouraging unionization, pushing legislators to adopt broader protections for workers, combatting structural inequalities, and engaging in these endeavours through an anti-racist lens. If you have questions about your specific employment situation, we encourage you to seek legal advice.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without an assessment of your individual circumstances.]

In a decision released June 17, 2020, the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled that if any element of a termination provision in an employment contract runs afoul of the Employment Standards Act, the whole termination provision is invalid.

In Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc. the Plaintiff sued his employer after he was dismissed with two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice following eight months of service. The Plaintiff’s employment contract had a termination with notice provision, and also had a termination for cause provision. On a summary judgement motion, the Defendant Employer conceded that the termination for cause provision violated the Employment Standards Act and was invalid, but argued that it was separate from the termination with notice provision that the employer was relying on in the case. The employer also relied on a severability clause contained in the agreement.

The motions judge found that the two provisions were sufficiently separate that the termination-for-cause provision did not cause the termination with notice provision to be invalid despite its violation of the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal overturned that finding. The Court found that an employment agreement must be interpreted as a whole. The fact that two termination clauses are contained in different paragraphs in the contract, or under different subheadings, does not affect the interpretation of the contract. The termination provisions must be read as a whole if the policy goal of discouraging employers from drafting contracts that violate the Act is to be met. Additionally, the Court of Appeal found that the employer could not rely on a severability provision to cure otherwise illegal contract clauses.

This decision clarifies a somewhat unsettled area of the law of wrongful dismissal. It reaffirms the principle that a termination provision in an employment contract may be invalidated if any termination situation would result in the employee receiving less than they are entitled to under the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal’s decision also serves as an important reminder that employment contracts will not be enforced where they violate the basic protections in the Act. If you have been terminated, you should seek legal advice and not rely solely on the words in your employment contract.

[This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, which cannot be given without consideration of your individual circumstances.]